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LECTURE ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AND ITS MISSION

* * * *

PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 MARCH 1948

ВΥ

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BRIG. GENERAL E. K. WRIGHT, U. S. A.



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THIS TALK, FROM MY VIEWPOINT, IS

BEING APPROACHED WITH SOME SHYNESS AND

CONSIDERABLE MISGIVING -- WHEN I THINK OF

THE STATURE OF YOUR USUAL GUEST SPEAKERS.

BECAUSE OF THAT, AND WITH DEFERENCE TO MY

AGE, I HOPE YOU WILL PERMIT A DEPARTURE

FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND IS A USUAL CUSTOM

-- HANDING MY PREPARED DISCUSSION TO THE

DIRECTOR AND SHOOTING OFF THE CUFF".

A DISCUSSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ITS MISSION INVOLVES MANY
ANGLES AND I PROPOSE TO COVER THEM UNDER
THREE GENERAL HEADINGS:

1. THE BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE FORMATION OF SUCH AN AGENCY.

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- 2. THE GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL

 STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY AND ITS POSITION
 IN THE NATIONAL PICTURE.
- 3. A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENCY.

CENCE HAS A HISTORY. IT DEFINITELY HAS A LURID PAST. WE BELIEVE IT HAS A BRILLIANT FUTURE. BUT THAT FUTURE DEPENDS A GREAT DEAL ON A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BY ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE INTELLI-GENCE NEEDS OF THE NATION.

ONE OF THE GREATEST THINGS THAT HAS

COME OUT OF THE RECENT WAR HAS BEEN THE

TREMENDOUS GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE TECH
NIQUES AND THE AWARENESS OF BOTH CIVILIAN

AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ITS EXISTENCE.

BEFORE THE WAR, AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE

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WAS MAINLY A STAFF FUNCTION RELEGATED,
UNFORTUNATELY, TO AN ALL TOO SMALL A
POSITION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

I THINK IT CAN BE SAID WITHOUT

CHALLENGE THAT BEFORE THE WAR OUR INTELLI
GENCE SERVICE COULD IN BUT FEW WAYS COMPARE

WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA,

GERMANY, OR JAPAN. WE HAD A POOR INTELLI
GENCE SERVICE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THIS

COUNTRY DID NOT BELIEVE IN IT. IT WAS FELT

THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUT

ESPIONAGE AND EVEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

GENERALLY.

AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF

SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO A GLOBAL WAR,

IMMENSE GAFS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY

APPARENT. THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY

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TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION. EACH NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS THE OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF THEIR OWN, EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF UNCOORDINATED INFORMA-TION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR AND NAVY DEPART-MENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE STAFFS--AS DID THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF O.S.S. THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ITS SUCCESSOR. THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED BRANCHES IN LONDON, ON THE CONTINENT, AND IN THE PACIFIC AREAS.

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WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN, OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD TO CHOOSE FROM THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, ONI, OR THE O.S.S. -- JUST TO NAME A FEW. AND, BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE BEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT <u>ITS</u> REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT BE DISREGARDED.

THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD PLACE TO TALK A

LITTLE ABOUT THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SER
VICES--THE O. S. S. IT WAS ONE OF THE COMPET
ING AGENCIES MENTIONED. BUT REGARDLESS OF

ITS VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE

FIELD AND CERTAIN OF ITS KNOWN FAILURES,

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IT NEVERTHELESS MARKED A TURNING POINT IN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLI
GENCE SYSTEM.

AS YOU KNOW, THE O.S.S. WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE O.S.S., ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIELD. IT WAS A STOP-GAP. OVERNIGHT IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO PERFORM THAT THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AGGRESSIVELY SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS, THE WORK OF THE O. S. S. WAS QUITE REMARKABLE AND ITS FAILURES MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ITS SUCCESSES. IT IS

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EXPRESSING IT LIGHTLY TO SAY THAT WE GREATLY PROFIT BY ITS ACTIVITIES, ITS EXPERIENCES, AND ITS MISTAKES.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR PRE-WAR

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WERE HIGH-LIGHTED BY

THE STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED

THE ATTACK ON HAWAII. THE COMMITTEE MADE

MANY SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN

INCORPORATED INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING.

TO BRIEF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, THEY FOUND THAT:

1. VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION

HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY OR THOROUGHLY

EVALUATED.

2. A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANT

EVALUATED INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN PASSED

TO FIELD COMMANDERS.

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- 3. OBVIOUS SOURCES HAD NOT BEEN EXPLOITED.
- 4. THE COLLECTION AND DESSEMINA-

TO BRIEF THEIR CONCLUSIONS EVEN FURTHER,

THEY STRESSED THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE

INTELLIGENCE.

WITHOUT BORING YOU WITH A MASS OF
QUOTATIONS FROM THE REPORT, IT IS PERTINENT
TO QUOTE ONE BRIEF PARAGRAPH:

"THE SECURITY OF THE NATION CAN

BE INSURED ONLY THROUGH CONTINUITY OF

SERVICE AND CENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

IN THOSE CHARGED WITH HANDLING INTELLIGENCE."

THE END OF THE WAR FOUND THE UNITED
STATES IN A POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL
IMPORTANCE AND POWER IN A VERY UNSTABLE

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WORLD--AND THAT POSITION MAINTAINS TODAY. WE MUST NEVER AGAIN FIND OURSELVES CON-FRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF INTELLI-GENCE COLLECTED, COMPILED, AND INTERPRETED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN JUST THAT POSITION, AS REGARDED THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. FOR LEAN MONTHS WE HAD TO TRUST BLINDLY AND TRUSTINGLY ON THE SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF THE BRITISH. OUR SUCCESSES PROVE THAT THIS TRUST WAS WELL PLACED,

HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A NATION
HAVING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, THE UNITED
STATES MUST NEVER AGAIN BE FORCED TO GO,
HAT IN HAND, BEGGING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

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FOR THE EYES--THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE--WITH WHICH TO SEE.

TO BRING US UP TO DATE -- OUR WAR

EXPERIENCE, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED

THE HAWAIIAN ATTACK, AND THE STUDIES OF

MANY OTHER GROUPS AND COMMITTEES, FOCUSED

ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A CENTRALIZED

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AS MOST OF YOU KNOW, A NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED BY

EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE IN JANUARY 1946. THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WAS DESIGNATED

AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. SINCE THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE GROUP HAS THE BEEN LEGALIZED

BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947--

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UNDER THE NAME OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY--I SHALL NOT DISCUSS THE OLD ORGANI
ZATION FURTHER--BUT WILL PROCEED TO THE NEW.

YOU ARE ALL ACQUAINTED WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND
ITS FUNCTIONS. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IS ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS COUNCIL.

TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THEREFORE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THE PLACE
OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY,
WHICH SPECIFICALLY ABOLISHED BY THE ACT.
IT THEREFORE IS THE AUTHORITY FOR DIRECTING
THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND COORDINATION
OF ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 PRO-

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FROM EITHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY LIFE. CERTAIN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE THEN INCLUDED, SO THAT THE DIRECTOR SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SUPERVISION, RESTRIC-TIONS AND PROHIBITIONS WHICH APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT PROVIDES THAT HE IS NOT TO POSSESS OR EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISION, CONTROL, POWERS OR FUNCTIONS --OTHER THAN THOSE HE WOULD EXERCISE AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--OVER ANY COMPONENT OF THE ARMED SERVICES. THESE CLAUSES WERE INCLUDED IN THE ACT TO ASSURE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE DIRECTOR WOULD BE FREE FROM UNDUE SERVICE POLITICS OR INFLUENCE.

THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT OUR AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENA,

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SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WE ARE MOST HAPPY TO

HAVE THIS INCLUDED IN THE LAW. WE HAVE

CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT CENTRAL INTELLI
GENCE HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH

POLICE POWERS OR FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH

THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ARE PROPERLY

A PART OF THE WORK OF THE F. B. I., AND WE HAVE

NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE WITH THIS. IT IS A

BURDEN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO ASSUME.

WE HAVE CERTAIN DEFINITE FUNCTIONS
UNDER THE LAW WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE.

FIRST IS THE DUTY TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE
COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE GOVERNMENT INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS PLANNED

COORDINATION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE

IN DETERMINING PRIMARY FIELDS OF INTELLI
GENCE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS DEPART
MENTS AND AGENCIES. WE ARE--IN THE FIELDS

OF COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION

--WORKING TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS;

THAT IS, TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE ROLES AND

MISSIONS. AND TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE SERVICES

IN CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS.

THE NEXT PROVISION OF THE LAW PROVIDES

FOR THE CORRELATION AND EVALUATION WITHIN

THE GOVERNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO

THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS A MAJOR

COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTELLI
GENCE AGENCY.

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THE LAW DIRECTS THAT THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL PROVIDE FOR THE

APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT MAKES THE DIRECTOR

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBLE FOR

PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS

DIRECTED TO PERFORM, FOR THE BENEFIT OF

THE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SUCH

ADDITIONAL SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN AS

CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED

CENTRALLY. AND THE AGENCY IS FURTHER

DIRECTED TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS

AND DUTIES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE NATIONAL SECUR-

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IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT, EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF THESE FUNCTIONS BY THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WILL ACCRUE TO THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COLLECTION. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO THAT DEPARTMENT IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY WITHIN THAT DEPARTMENT.

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THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE NATION. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL NECESTITY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND INTERPRET THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH IS WITHIN ITS OWN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED FOR ITS OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IN ADDITION TO

ITS COORDINATING AND COLLECTION FUNCTIONS,

MUST DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE ON A NATIONAL,

AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL, LEVEL.

THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CONDUCTED BY

THE CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE

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PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD OF

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. ON THESE ESTIMATES

THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS

CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO

BASE THEIR POLICIES. AND IT MUST BE CLEARLY

BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY.

THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM

OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLI—

GENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR FORMER

INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE ESTIMATES

MUST REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE,

COMPLETE AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A

CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS

MATERIAL, OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD

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MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES,

EACH TURNING OUT COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT

A CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED

PRODUCT.

NOW AS TO A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CIA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE -- AND I HOPE TO KEEP IT GENERAL AS I KNOW YOU MUST BE PLAGUED WITH THE REVIEW OF DETAILED ORGANI-ZATIONAL CHARTS WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY FORGOTTEN. YOU WILL NOTE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IN ADDITION TO THE FUNCTION OF COORDINATING THE COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING ACTIVITIES OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, HAS CERTAIN COLLECTION, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING OPERATIONS

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OF ITS OWN. TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS
WE HAVE ESTABLISHED FOUR SEPARATE OFFICES
EACH UNDER AN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WITH AN
OVER-ALL SERVICE TYPE OF EXECUTIVE STAFF.

STAFF PART OF THE PICTURE. THE DIRECTOR

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE DEPUTY

DIRECTOR ARE NOT ASSIGNED SEPARATE SPECIFIC

TASKS AS IT IS INTENDED THAT THE DEPUTY BE

THE ALTER-EGO OF THE DIRECTOR.

THE STAFF IS ACTUALLY BROKEN DOWN
INTO TWO SEPARATE STAFFS, ONE PROVIDING
THE NORMAL EXECUTIVE STAFF FUNCTIONS AND
ANOTHER, SMALLER STAFF, WHICH CONSIDERS
ONLY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL PHASES OF OUR
OPERATIONS. THE EXECUTIVE STAFF, HEADED

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BY AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROVIDES FOR THE PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATIVE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES, INVESTIGATIVE, AND AUDIT FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS. NOW AS TO THE FOUR MAJOR OFFICES.

THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS PROVIDES FOR THE ENTIRE SCOPE OF OUR OVERT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND FOR THE CONDUCT OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF COMMON CONCERN TO ALL DEPART-MENTS AND AGENCIES. THIS OFFICE IS RESPON-

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IT PROVIDES, THROUGH ITS DOCUMENT BRANCH, FOR THE SCREENING OF ALL FOREIGN DOCUMENTS, PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC., FOR INTELLI-GENCE PURPOSES.

THE OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES PROVIDES FOR THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH FLOWS IN FROM ALL SOURCES, ENGAGES IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THIS F!ELD WITH ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, AND PREPARES THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINA-TION MONITORS THE FLOW OF ALL INCOMING AND OUTGOING INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL AND ASSISTS THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN OBTAINING THEIR WANTS ON A REQUEST BASIS,

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THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CONDUCTS ALL ORGANIZED FEDERAL ESPIONAGE

AND COUNTER-ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS OUTSIDE

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS FOR

THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. IT

OPERATES FOR THE DIRECTOR IN COORDINATING,

IN THE FIELD, THE COVERT AND OVERT INTELLI
GENCE COLLECTING ACTIVITIES.

YOU WILL REALIZE THE NECESSITY FOR

CENTRALIZING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IF WE

DESIRE TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE

FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY, AN ESPIONAGE

SYSTEM ON AT LEAST A PAR WITH OTHER GOVERN
MENTS. IT IS TRUE THAT ONLY ABOUT 15 PER

CENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMA
TION COLLECTED BY ALL AGENCIES WILL BE

OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. YET THIS

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GAP MUST BE FILLED AND THE INFORMATION THUS

OBTAINED WILL OFTEN GREATLY EXCEL IN IMPOR
TANCE THE LARGER PERCENTAGE OBTAINED BY

OVERT METHODS.

THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION BY

CLANDESTINE MEANS HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED

AND, UNFORTUNATELY, OVER-PUBLICIZED, HOW
EVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANKLY ACKNOW
LEDGE THE NEED FOR AND PROVIDE THE MEANS

OF COLLECTING THAT INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN

ONLY BE OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS.

IN THIS WE ONLY FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS,

THE POLICY AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY MAJOR FOREIGN

POWER.

WHEN PROPERLY PROVIDED FOR AND ESTABLISHED, THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE CENTRALIZED
IN ONE AGENCY. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BRITISH

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SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OVER HUNDREDS

OF YEARS PROVES THIS. THE GERMANS VIOLATED

THIS PRINCIPLE—AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE

JAPANESE—WITH KNOWN DISASTROUS RESULTS.

FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTIPLICITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. STUDY OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TALKS WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE OPERATED IN THE FIELD OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, AND INTERROGATION OF TOP INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS OF THE AXIS COUNTRIES, HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE RESULT IS CHAOS. INTERNAL BICKERING AND SNIPING DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE TOO MANY GERMAN SPY ORGANIZATIONS, EACH OF THEM JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL DEVELOPED A POLICY OF SECRECY, SO THAT EACH MIGHT BE

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THE GROUP TO PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT TO THE LEADERS. COORDINATION WENT OUT THE WINDOW.

THE CLANDESTINE FIELD, THE MOST SENSITIVE
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, WE MUST DO IT
WITH FULL REGARD TO THE EXPERIENCE AND
METHODS OF THE FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH
HAVE BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL.

OUT THAT, AS AN OPERATING AGENCY, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE IS NOW OVER TWO YEARS OLD AND
HAS THE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CERTAIN FUNCTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EXIS—
TENCE FOR MANY MORE YEARS. WE FEEL THAT
MUCH IS STILL TO BE DONE IN THE FIELD OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUT WE ARE ALSO HAPPY

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OVER THE PROGRESS TO DATE. WE HAVE BEEN WELL BACKED BY CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY PUBLIC OPINION. WE HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY THEIR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

THERE ARE NO DOUBT MANY QUESTIONS IN
YOUR MIND AND I REALIZE THAT, FOLLOWING
THIS PERIOD, I MUST STAND UP HERE AND
"TAKE THEM." I ASSURE YOU THAT QUESTIONS
WHICH CAN BE ANSWERED WILL BE ANSWERED
FRANKLY AND SINCERELY. I HOPE YOU WILL
FORGIVE ME IF I REFUSE AN ANSWER BECAUSE
OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

TO BE HERE WITH YOU.